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RIPPING OFF THE BAND-AID: SCRUTINY BUNDLING IN THE
WAKE OF SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL
VARKEY K. TITUS JR.
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
OWEN PARKER
Oklahoma State University
A. ERIN BASS
University of Nebraska–Omaha
Activities that hazard the possibility of increased scrutiny are an unavoidable reality for
many firms. While managers may face the need to engage in these activities, there is little
research on when managers decide to do so. Existing theoretical perspectives on status
quo deviations have not sufficiently addressed how managers order the firm’s essential
activities that differ primarily in terms of the scrutiny those activities engender. Drawing
from concepts in the accounting and political science literatures, we advance a “scrutiny-bundling” perspective that suggests that firms engage in scrutiny-hazarding action
in the wake of social disapproval, assessed in this study via negative media coverage.
We further theorize that a strong linkage between the focus of media coverage and the
specific scrutiny-hazarding action exacerbates this relationship. We then contend that
managers at firms that are either large in size or that perform well relative to their
aspirations are less sensitive to social disapproval, and are therefore less likely to engage in scrutiny bundling. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 100 firms in the
upstream petroleum industry and find general support for our theories.

social disapproval influences subsequent decisionmaking (Petkova, Wadhwa, Yao, & Jain, 2014). Even
less clear is when managers might engage in
activities that hazard potentially burdensome
scrutiny from stakeholders, but are essential to their
operations.1
To address the question of when firms engage in
activities that, although scrutiny hazarding, are core
to their strategy, we draw on evidence from the accounting (Kirschenheiter & Melumad, 2002) and
political science literatures (McArdle, 2013), which
have suggested that decision-makers are motivated
to reduce the duration of negative events, even at the
expense of greater momentary negativity. The idiom
of “ripping off the Band-Aid” is reflective of this
principle, such that there is a perceived benefit to
enduring more or sharper pain over the short term in
exchange for less pain over the long term. We utilize
theory on stakeholder attention (Barnett, 2014;

Unpopular organizational actions are often
unavoidable. Firms must sometimes engage in activities that burden the organization with unwanted
scrutiny, but are nevertheless integral to the firm’s
strategy. For example, a steel manufacturer may
need to run a plant that releases sulfur dioxide and
other pollutants, a petroleum firm may need to drill
for oil, and a forestry firm may harvest lumber.
Unfortunately, the available literature has provided
little guidance on when managers will pursue such
activities, particularly when the firm is already
burdened with stakeholders’ negative affinity, or
“social disapproval” (e.g., Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).
Moreover, though there have been substantial recent strides in our understanding of the elements
and origins of social approval (e.g., Bundy & Pfarrer,
2015), we still know relatively little about how
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anonymous reviewers for their developmental comments
and guidance.

1

Importantly, the necessity of engaging in such activities
does not, by itself, connote industry-level stigma (e.g.,
Mishina & Devers, 2012), but instead points to the costs of
doing business across a wide array of task environments.
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Madsen & Rodgers, 2015) and event strength
(Morgeson, Mitchell, & Liu, 2015) to argue that social
disapproval is one key driver of scrutiny-hazarding
activity by managers.
In this research, we use the term “scrutiny” in
reference to burdensome attention directed toward
the firm (Desai, 2011; Fiss & Zajac, 2006), and define
“scrutiny-hazarding action” as those activities that
are indispensable to the firm’s strategy, but are also
likely to burden the firm’s managers by attracting
a problematic, aggregate level of scrutiny from
stakeholders. We focus on aggregate scrutiny because actions that draw scrutiny from a narrow
stakeholder contingent are unlikely to burden the
firm sufficiently to prompt managers to engage in
activities that might engender more scrutiny
(Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).
Social approval or disapproval arises from stakeholders’ intuitive, affective perceptions about how
“likable” a firm is (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). Conventional theoretical perspectives have indicated that,
when faced with social disapproval, firms may respond by avoiding activities that put the firm “under
the microscope” (i.e., increase scrutiny) (Staw,
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), attempting to distract
or placate stakeholders (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, &
Shapiro, 2012), or pursuing a problem-resolution
agenda aimed at rectifying the source of the problem
(Audia & Greve, 2006). Research has suggested that
social disapproval may motivate organizational
change (Bednar, Boivie, & Prince, 2013), divestment
from stigmatized industries (Durand & Vergne,
2015), or the use of strategic noise to distract from
scrutiny (Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011). However, these theoretical perspectives and available
evidence have focused on actions that deviate from
the status quo, and thus have not addressed how
firms respond when they cannot deviate or distract
from status quo activities, such as when these activities are strategically indispensable. That is, in many
instances, managers are unable to sidestep stakeholder scrutiny, and major strategic changes are
unwarranted or unfeasible. This raises the question
of how social disapproval influences managerial
decision-making related to core strategic behaviors
that are likely to arouse scrutiny.
We posit that, in the wake of social disapproval,
managers will engage in scrutiny-hazarding action to
stymie protracted negativity (Bies, 2013; Morgeson
et al., 2015) and to exploit stakeholders’ limited
capacity to attend and proportionally respond to temporally clustered and repeated events (Barnett, 2014;
Miller, 1956). We refer to this phenomenon as “scrutiny
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bundling.” We develop this scrutiny-bundling framework in two key ways.
First, we contend that the linkage between social
disapproval and scrutiny-hazarding action is stronger
when the focus of the media coverage is connected
to the scrutiny-hazarding action that managers can
pursue. For example, a petroleum company that
faces social disapproval for its involvement in environmentally controversial hydraulic fracturing activities (fracking) may hasten its drilling activities
because the disapproval due to fracking is closely
related to the scrutiny-hazarding action of drilling.
On the other hand, the same firm may be only
somewhat motivated to hasten disclosure of its plans
for new pipeline construction, as the fracking-based
disapproval is relatively less directly related to the
scrutiny-hazarding action of pipeline construction.
Both the increase in drilling and the pipeline construction are activities that are unavoidable and scrutiny hazarding. The relevant question to our research
is how the firm’s burden of social disapproval—that is,
the magnitude and the subject content—influences
when managers decide to engage in scrutiny-hazarding
action.
Second, we extend this scrutiny-bundling framework to contend that not all firms are equally pressured to respond to social disapproval in the same
way. We theorize that managers at firms that are either (a) large in size or (b) perform well relative to
their financial aspirations are less sensitive to the
pressure of social disapproval, and therefore are less
likely to engage in scrutiny bundling. Therefore,
we hypothesize that a firm’s size and its aspirationrelative performance each serve as buffers to attenuate the relationship between social disapproval and
scrutiny-hazarding action.
We point to the limits of information processing
and stakeholder attention to highlight why managers
may pursue a scrutiny-bundling response (i.e., more
scrutiny-hazarding action in the wake of social
disapproval). We examine these issues within the
context of the upstream petroleum industry, using
a sample of 100 firms. We augment the findings from
our quantitative analysis with color casting by executives in the upstream petroleum industry. That is,
to further understand the phenomenon at hand, we
presented our research question and findings to executives and asked them whether, in fact, media
coverage matters to managers, and how it influences
decision-making related to strategic activities. We
thereby gain a richer understanding of the scrutinybundling perspective that is grounded in both theory
and practice.
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We make several contributions with our study.
First, we contribute to the burgeoning social evaluation literature in management scholarship by
underscoring the role that social approval plays in
shaping strategic decision-making. As elucidated by
Petkova et al. (2014), much of the prior work in this
stream has addressed how social evaluations such as
reputation lead managers to make decisions aimed
at cultivating and protecting this intangible asset
(Weigelt & Camerer, 1988), but this has left the general influence of social evaluations on broader
decision-making largely unexamined. Our study
extends this line of research to demonstrate the
temporal nature of managerial decision-making in
the wake of social disapproval, such that, when faced
with social disapproval, managers might choose to
engage in scrutiny-hazarding action, thereby alleviating the burden of prolonged scrutiny.
Second, we extend recent conceptual work on
how social approval influences crisis response
(Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015) by applying similar reasoning to social approval’s influence on strategic
decisions relating to core activities. How social
disapproval influences a firm’s strategy is largely
unknown, not least because scholars have attempted
to distinguish this affective dimension of social
evaluation from the adjacent, but more deliberate,
analytical assessments of the firm’s appropriateness
(i.e., legitimacy) and ability to deliver value
(i.e., reputation) (Bitektine, 2011; Bundy & Pfarrer,
2015). Furthermore, many of the studies on social
disapproval have focused on organizational responses to “extreme” contexts, such as high-pressure
events—for example, crises or the revelation of organizational wrongdoing (e.g., Desai, 2011)—or responses within contested or stigmatized industries
(Durand & Vergne, 2015). Such extreme contexts and
events are, as implied by the descriptor itself, rare
and not representative of a majority of social evaluation circumstances. On the contrary, many firms
deal with the chronic but critical pressure from
stakeholders in the form of social disapproval
(Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015) based on the activities in
which the firm engages in its everyday operations.
We therefore contribute by theorizing and testing the
influence of social approval on decisions relating to
activities that are integral to the firm’s daily operations, which describe the majority of firm activity.
Third, we expand upon the notion of “buffers” from
external pressure (e.g., Audia & Greve, 2006; Desai,
2008) by exploring two contingency factors: firm size
and aspiration-relative performance. That outside
pressure has a sizable influence on decision-making

639

is well established. For example, the managerial discretion literature has indicated that stakeholder
pressure can constrain discretion latitude such that it
influences how managerial decision-making should
be interpreted (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Shen &
Cho, 2005). However, missing from this discussion is
comparable attention to the protective factors that
may mitigate the influences of this pressure on organizations. With this study, we contend that a firm’s
size and its aspiration-relative performance at least
partially insulate it from the hazards of such outside
pressure, thereby alleviating some of the constraints
on managers’ strategic decision-making.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Scrutiny Bundling as a Response Strategy to
Social Disapproval
Scrutiny consists of attention that is inherently
burdensome, because the firm is “under the microscope” (Desai, 2011; Fiss & Zajac, 2006). Importantly,
scrutiny is distinct from social disapproval. Following Bundy and Pfarrer (2015: 345), social approval here refers to “evaluators’ general affinity
toward an organization.” This affinity “can be leveraged to build and maintain relationships, engender
higher performance, and enhance an organization’s
chances of survival (e.g., Vergne, 2012; Zavyalova
et al., 2012).” Social disapproval is the extent of unfavorable affinity that evaluators have toward the
organization. This implies that firms facing disapproval are disadvantaged with respect to their
potential to build relationships and improve their
survival prospects. Following prior research, we
measure social disapproval via negative media
coverage (Bednar et al., 2013).
Unlike social disapproval, scrutiny does not imply
negative judgment. Social disapproval, on the other
hand, connotes negative judgment but does not imply the presence of burdensome scrutiny on the firm.
Thus, a major difference lies in the evaluative nature
of social disapproval versus scrutiny. Whereas disapproval puts a firm at a disadvantage relative to
relationships and survival, scrutiny is a concentrated, burdensome form of pressure that comes from
focused attention on the firm and its activities.
What is scrutiny-hazarding action? Every firm
action falls on a continuum from “very low likelihood of attracting scrutiny” at one extreme to “very
high likelihood of attracting scrutiny” at the other.
The scrutiny-hazarding action to which we refer
circumscribes those activities at the higher end of
this continuum. According to theory on stakeholder
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attention (Barnett, 2014; Madsen & Rodgers, 2015),
stakeholder groups differ and each group may have
different perceptions of whether a certain action
constitutes a problem that warrants scrutinizing the
firm. As an example, clear cutting in the forestry industry may attract scrutiny from some stakeholder
groups, such as environmental activists or people
who live in the communities next to the clear-cutting
activity, because these stakeholder groups view clear
cutting—although core to many forestry company’s
operations—to be incompatible with their values
or beliefs. Thus, clear cutting represents scrutinyhazarding action. Similarly, product testing in the
cosmetics-manufacturing industry may attract scrutiny from animal activist groups, such as PETA, because these groups view animal testing as unethical
and cruel, yet product testing is a U.S. Federal Drug
Administration requirement. As such, our threshold
for scrutiny-hazarding action is not whether just one
stakeholder group directs scrutiny toward the firm,
but whether the aggregate scrutiny that is expected to
arise as a result of an action is burdensome for the
firm.
Distraction of stakeholders is substantially more
difficult and less feasible when managers are obligated to execute scrutiny-hazarding action because
these activities are indispensable to the firm’s strategy. The strategic importance of the scrutinyhazarding action and its close conceptual linkage
with what the firm is “known for” diminishes the
utility of strategic noise (Graffin et al., 2011) and
other distracting and placating techniques (Zavyalova
et al., 2012) in minimizing the hazard of such scrutiny.
This is because stakeholders carefully attend to the
salient aspects of the firm that best capture their interests, and a firm’s core activities are central among
these (Hosmer & Kiewitz, 2005). This implies that the
activities in question cannot be circumvented or exchanged for activities that are less scrutiny hazarding.
As suggested to us by one vice president of engineering, in some instances, “There is no compromise
short of getting out of the business that satisfies the
press. Companies running their business within the
regulations will continue to ensure they do so, even
in the face of opposition.”
To illustrate, a steel manufacturing firm releases
sulfur dioxide, a pollutant that can become trapped
between buildings and the ground, in the process of
metalworking. This sulfur dioxide is an unwanted
byproduct of the steel manufacturing process, and
how managers choose to deal with this byproduct, or
how much they choose to produce knowing this byproduct can be harmful, represents decisions related
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to everyday operations of the plant, and not simply
a one-off decision resulting from a crisis or organizational wrongdoing (Desai, 2011).2 Thus, managers
make decisions about when to manufacture more (or
less) steel—and therefore when to produce more (or
less) byproduct. Similarly, petroleum companies rely
on two activities for operation—accessing and developing petroleum—and the latter often evokes controversy because of the impact its extractive nature has
on the environment. In other words, barring a radical
change of business practices (e.g., new processes for
steel manufacturing, economically viable alternatives
to fossil fuels), a firm’s immediate circumstances may
induce managers to hasten more scrutiny-hazarding
action (e.g., manufacturing more steel and releasing
more sulfur dioxide, and increasing its drilling program and extracting more petroleum resources).
Our contention is that scrutiny-hazarding action
describes activities that are integral to the firm’s
strategy, but may place the firm at risk for burdensome scrutiny in the short term. Because scrutinyhazarding action describes activities that are part of
everyday operations, and thus unavoidable, the open
question is: When do managers decide to engage in
scrutiny-hazarding action?
Context specificity of scrutiny-hazarding action.
Any particular activity may attract scrutiny in one
task environment, yet have a different, less negative
effect in a different task environment. For example,
in the petroleum industry, resource development
(including drilling and production) tends to attract
significant scrutiny, as development is a notoriously
controversial issue. By contrast, in the real estate
industry, resource development (including building
homes and office complexes on property the developer already owns) may be viewed more favorably. As such, our aim is not to point to a list of
universally applicable scrutiny-hazarding actions,
but rather to develop our understanding of scrutinyhazarding action by zeroing in on a specific context
and elaborating how managers’ use of scrutinyhazarding action is influenced by social disapproval.
We contend that scrutiny bundling represents
a response to social disapproval in which managers
hasten scrutiny-hazarding action. Although this
Our conceptual framework is based on “everyday”
actions, rather than the extreme cases of organizational
crises. Nevertheless, the crisis response literature provides
an insightful adjacent logic. Stakeholders tend to perceive
crisis responses as genuine and effortful when they are
closely related to the crisis, making these more effective at
placating stakeholders’ concerns (Zavyalova et al., 2012).
2
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temporally condenses scrutiny of the firm, it does so
to limit the aggregate, burdensome effect of scrutiny.
Embedded within this expectation are two fundamental assumptions, which we discuss in the following paragraphs.
The perceived hazard of protracted scrutiny.
The first assumption underpinning our framework is
that protracted scrutiny toward the firm presents
more of a threat—from management’s perspective—
than does a briefer, higher magnitude of scrutiny.
The accounting and political science literatures provide a worthwhile starting point for this conceptual
development.
One well-known concept in the accounting literature is the phenomenon of the “earnings bath”
(Kirschenheiter & Melumad, 2002), in which managers amplify a weak earnings report by significantly
underreporting earnings in a particular time period,
thereby facilitating a stronger earnings report in the
future. In particular, a firm’s earnings performance in
a given quarter is compared against a “consensus
estimate” of analysts (Beshears & Milkman, 2011).
The failure to achieve an earnings target casts doubt
on the firm’s ability to deliver consistent performance over time (Fox, 1997; Graham, Harvey, &
Rajgopal, 2005). Because of the hazards associated
with a negative earnings surprise, managers may
tweak the firm’s financial statements in the wake of
disappointing earnings (Brown & Pinello, 2007),
shifting future expenses and write-offs to the current
period so that the firm’s future net earnings imply an
upward trajectory. The shifting of these burdensome
expenses to the already problematic period of
underperformance is the basis for the “big bath” or
“earnings bath” notion. Other sources have suggested that some new CEOs may engage in similar
behavior, assuming greater expenses at the outset to
allow for a seeming improvement in returns over
their tenure (Blackstone, 2014).
The notion of the earnings bath in the accounting
literature parallels a similar phenomenon in the political science literature. In the political science
sphere, the rapid-fire revelation of bad news has been
underscored as a means of moving past one’s transgressions in order to clean up one’s image going
forward. For example, over the course of the 2016
U.S. Democratic presidential primary and the ensuing general election campaign, the periodic revelations about Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email
server during her tenure as secretary of state to allegedly send classified correspondence may have
harmed the public’s perception of her more than a single, dramatic revelation might have (Bradner, 2015).
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Similarly, throughout the 2012 American presidential
campaign, then-presidential candidate Mitt Romney
was recorded (Moorhead, 2012) making what was
generally viewed as a disparaging remark about a wide
swath of the American electorate:
There are 47 percent who are with [President Obama],
who are dependent upon government, who believe
that they are victims . . . who believe that they are
entitled to health care, to food, to housing, to youname-it . . . And they will vote for this president no
matter what.

In the wake of the backlash of social disapproval
from this statement, Romney’s campaign released
his 2011 tax returns just days later. Though Romney
was originally reluctant to reveal details of his
wealth, several journalists posited that Romney’s
team timed the release strategically, believing that
the added scrutiny would be less damaging if it
came amid the fallout surrounding his “47 percent”
comment (Cillizza, 2012).
Within the corporate context, Tylenol and parent
company Johnson & Johnson faced a difficult public
relations episode several decades ago. In 1982, an
individual who was completely unrelated to either
company inserted cyanide into Tylenol capsules,
and precipitated the deaths of seven people who
used the product. Once this information became
public, Johnson & Johnson’s CEO James Burke publicly disclosed the weaknesses of the Tylenol bottle
design as part of the problem, and instituted a preemptive recall before the full extent of contamination
was known (Moore, 1982). These preemptive actions
ultimately cost the company an estimated $100
million (Wharton School, 2012). However, the decision to hasten revelations about bottle design flaws
and thus increase the scrutiny Johnson & Johnson
faced might have minimized the cumulative fallout
that these separate revelations would have garnered
if they were temporally more distant. Tylenol recovered from the incident, and increased its share of
the analgesic market to 35% by the end of the following year.
The available theory and evidence in the management literature also suggests that negative stimuli
can be more problematic when protracted, or drawn
out over time. Morgeson et al. (2015) asserted that
organizational events can be variously disruptive,
critical, and novel, and that the duration of a problematic event—such as a protracted lawsuit—is
proportional to its impact on the firm (Morgeson &
DeRue, 2006; Morgeson et al., 2015). As Morgeson et al.
(2015: 527) noted, “When events linger, additional
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attention and resources may be needed to ultimately
respond to the event itself.” In aggregate, the preceding argumentation underscores that managers
may perceive scrutiny bundling as a worthwhile
tradeoff of “more pain now” in exchange for “less
pain over time”—similar to the notion of “ripping off
the Band-Aid.”
Attention fatigue and stakeholders’ limited range
of response. The second assumption is that managers
perceive that temporally clustering scrutiny-hazarding
action will actually help reduce this perceived hazard of such scrutiny over time. Although we are not
concerned with the normative aspects of scrutiny
bundling—that is, whether it is effective at reducing
long-term scrutiny—it is worth considering why,
when faced with social disapproval, managers choose
to engage in more scrutiny-hazarding action. The
notion that it may be preferable to minimize the duration of a negative event is an intuitive concept, with
supporting evidence in both the psychology and
management literatures.
Evidence from psychology suggests that, when an
individual endures an uncomfortable, painful, or
otherwise negative event, clustering the negative
sensations toward the beginning of the experience
creates a perception of improvement, so that the individual’s memory of the event is more positive than
if the negative sensations had been evenly spread
throughout the whole experience (Ariely, 1998;
Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996). Evidence is similar
in the management literature, and suggests that
managers sometimes strive to deliver bad news
swiftly (Bies, 2012), but may, at other times, drag
their feet in delivering negative information to outside stakeholders (Black, 1976).
Furthermore, stakeholder attention is bounded,
and stakeholders may not proportionately scrutinize
or be influenced by negative stimuli when it is temporally concentrated. As one journalist summarized,
“There is only so much bad news people can take in
all at once, so you might as well cram all the bad
stuff” into a shorter time period (McArdle, 2013).
The idea that individuals are limited in their ability
to attend to multiple stimuli at once has recently been
applied to theory of stakeholder attention within management research (Barnett, 2014; Madsen & Rodgers,
2015). Relevant to our framework is Barnett’s (2014)
“noticing” phase, which suggests that stakeholders may
not seek to process additional negative information
even when it is readily observable. That is, not all
stakeholders are equally proactive at taking in additional negative information as such stimuli accumulate.
In the “assessing” phase, stakeholders may be variously
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“cognitively busy” such that their limits of information processing prevent them from proportionately increasing their unfavorable response to
additional negative revelations about the firm. Finally, in the “acting” phase, Barnett posited that,
beyond a certain threshold of negative stimuli,
stakeholders may perceive their efficacy in bringing
about change as diminished should they decide to
take action, because the aggregate problem has become too big to meaningfully influence. All three of
these elements suggest that there are diminishing
implications for stakeholder responses with incrementally greater negative stimuli in a narrow time
period.
The preceding sections suggest that, in the wake of
social disapproval, managers will perceive the hastening of scrutiny-hazarding action as worthwhile,
metaphorically “ripping off the Band-Aid” in an attempt to reduce the aggregate burden of scrutiny over
time. Regardless of whether such a course of action is
effective at minimizing aggregate scrutiny over a period of time, we expect that the limited prospects that
managers face will lead them to hasten scrutinyhazarding action subsequent to social disapproval
(i.e., engage in scrutiny bundling). Formally stated:
Hypothesis 1. Social disapproval is positively related
to scrutiny-hazarding action.

Conceptual Closeness between the Focus of Media
Coverage and Scrutiny-Hazarding Action
An important contingency on the predicted
linkage between social disapproval and scrutinyhazarding action is the conceptual closeness between the two. If the relationship between these two
elements is tenuous, we expect a weaker relationship
between social disapproval and scrutiny-hazarding
action, for two reasons. First, if evidence mirroring
the subject of the earlier social disapproval were
allowed to continue to “trickle out” incrementally
over time, the danger of confirming a stakeholder’s
initially unfavorable perception would be greater
(e.g., Tverskey & Kahnemann, 1974). The second
reason is more nuanced.
Individuals are less prone to proportionally attend
to temporally clustered stimuli relative to stimuli
that are spread out over time, and the conceptual
closeness of the clustered stimuli further complicates the process of maintaining attention. Stakeholders are likely to perceive a series of similar,
clustered events as “more of the same,” and not attend
to these events as much as they might to the same
events spread out over time. Weick, Sutcliffe, and
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Obstfeld (2005) underscored that individual observers must first parse a stream of events into separate, relevant stimuli before focusing on them—a task
made more difficult when the events are tightly
clustered in a short span of time.
For instance, if a forestry firm experiences social
disapproval because of its deforestation activities
(social disapproval related to a lack of environmental
stewardship), we expect managers to subsequently
engage in activities that might also indicate a lack of
environmental stewardship—for example, construction of more logging or transport roads, or logging facilities. The capacity for stakeholders to notice and
proportionally respond to each additional bit of news
related to a lack of environmental stewardship is diminished relative to their capacity to attend and respond to similar events spread out over time.
In other words, the presence of social disapproval
based on lack of environmental stewardship might
spark managers to engage in other scrutiny-hazarding,
environmentally related activities. In contrast, if the
same firm cultivated social disapproval because of,
for example, its poor treatment of employees, managers would not hasten environmentally related
scrutiny-hazarding action, because there is less of
a chance that this (largely unrelated) action would
shorten the time span of the scrutiny. In the second
example, the conceptual closeness of the social disapproval and scrutiny-hazarding action is weaker
because the firm’s “poor treatment of employees” is
not related to a lack of environmental stewardship. The strongest relationship within this scenario
would likely be when social disapproval stems
from deforestation activities, and the firm is able to
subsequently hasten or increase those very same deforestation activities in the short term, to avoid
delayed scrutiny if those same activities were done at
a later time.
We contend that, when the subject of the social
disapproval is closely tied to the scrutiny-hazarding
action available to the manager, managers will be
more likely to engage in scrutiny bundling in an effort to minimize the duration of the scrutiny experienced by the firm. This conceptual argument was
partially supported by an individual with experience
in the chief operating officer role, who posited, “I
would say that [negative media coverage] could
cause my company to more closely internally monitor and report on certain aspects of our operations—
especially areas that may be the focus of the media
attention.” The conceptual closeness between the
subject of the social disapproval and the scrutinyhazarding action may increase the perception of utility
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from scrutiny bundling because it effectively enables
managers to more quickly “rip off the Band-Aid.”
Thus:
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between social disapproval and scrutiny-hazarding action is stronger
(more positive) the more the focus of the media
coverage is conceptually related to the scrutinyhazarding action.

Buffering Factors
Not all decision-makers are affected equally by
social disapproval from external observers. Managers’ actions may be influenced by two key attributes: (1) the consistency of the feedback that filters
into their decision processes, and (2) the extent to
which they believe that the firm will be harmed by
failing to take action. When feedback is inconsistent,
it is less likely to demonstrably influence managerial
decision-making. Signals are more influential when
they are consistent (Heil & Robertson, 1991), and
evidence has suggested that the same applies to
managers’ interpretation of the veracity of performance feedback signals. For example, the literature
has suggested that the effect of negative media coverage (a way of assessing social disapproval) on an
individual firm can be diluted if such negative coverage is endemic across numerous firms within an
industry (Zavyalova et al., 2012), or if a firm in
a stigmatized product category attempts to establish
presence in a nonstigmatized category (Vergne,
2012). That is, certain factors are known to buffer
managers from being sensitive to social disapproval,
diluting its effect, and therefore the presence or absence of those factors influence how vulnerable
firms are to social disapproval. We argue that the
tendency for social disapproval to spur scrutinyhazarding action is contingent on the firm’s sensitivity to the social disapproval; this sensitivity, in
turn, depends on the consistency of performance
feedback provided to managers, and whether—in
light of this signal consistency—managers perceive
that the social disapproval constitutes an exigent
threat that warrants action.
Social disapproval amounts to stakeholders’ general lack of affinity toward an organization (Bundy &
Pfarrer, 2015), and, as such, the crux of its influence
on managerial decisions arises from managers’ beliefs that the disapproval constitutes a hazard that
may inhibit the firm’s core operations. However, the
extent to which decision-makers perceive that the
firm is “doing well” mitigates this hazard, because
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a firm that is achieving its core performance objectives may be less sensitive to the opinions of outside
observers. In the subsequent sections, we elaborate
on the role of a firm’s aspiration-relative performance, as well as its size—vis-à-vis its aggregate resource endowment—as factors that attenuate the
relationship between social disapproval and scrutinyhazarding action. Both of these factors influence the
extent to which managers believe the firm is sufficiently vulnerable to warrant remedial action.
Aspiration-Relative Performance as a Buffer
A firm’s financial performance constitutes a credible signal to decision-makers that the firm is in
a strong strategic position. Indeed, prior arguments
and evidence have suggested that a firm’s financial
performance is perhaps the quintessential indicator
of organizational success (e.g., Bednar et al., 2013). In
their study of how strategic change is influenced by
negative media coverage, Bednar et al. (2013) proposed that strong financial performance “muddies”
the signal from negative media coverage, thereby
weakening its effect on inducing strategic change.
Though our research question differs from that
of Bednar et al. (2013), in that we focus on social
disapproval’s influence on everyday operational
decisions via scrutiny-hazarding action, the fundamental premise that financial performance affects
managers’ sensitivity to the firm’s social approval
remains salient. To this point, we have discussed
social disapproval as a behavioral pressure upon
a firm’s decision-makers. In line with this reasoning,
an aspiration-relative performance metric aligns
with current theory regarding the salience of performance aspirations on firm behavior (Bromiley &
Harris, 2014) because of both the evidence provided
by the signal itself as well as what this information
implies for the firm’s survival prospects.
Decision-makers must make sense of the signals
received from various feedback sources as part of the
decision process (Lucas, Knoben, & Meeus, 2018),
and this process is more straightforward when these
signals are aligned (Barron & Rolfe, 2012). Both social disapproval and poor performance relative to
aspirations constitute forms of negative performance
feedback, providing a consistently unfavorable signal as to the firm’s performance, as well as adding to
the perception that the firm is vulnerable unless it
takes remedial action. This addresses both conditions that we expect influence managers’ sensitivity to the disapproval, and, as such, firms that are
underperforming financially are likely to be especially
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motivated to engage in scrutiny bundling by pursuing greater levels of scrutiny-hazarding action in the
wake of social disapproval.
Conversely, superior financial performance motivates a preference for the status quo, because threat
exigency is reduced when the firm performs well
relative to its aspirations (Audia, Locke, & Smith,
2000; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992). Strong performance may support a belief in the correctness of
current decision-making processes and outcomes
(Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993),
which in turn could prompt inertial tendencies and
make relevant decision-makers less sensitive to social disapproval. Similarly, strong aspirationrelative performance may make decision-makers
feel less vulnerable to social disapproval, as directly engaged stakeholder groups (e.g., employees
or shareholders) may be perceived as less likely to
exert pressure on a management team that produces
strong financial performance (Bundy & Pfarrer,
2015). Moreover, the conflicting signal of superior
financial performance in the wake of social disapproval undermines the consistency of unfavorable
feedback about the firm’s performance, thereby
weakening the perception that action is needed.
Because of these two conditions—inconsistency of
feedback and a lesser perceived threat of social
disapproval—when the firm has surpassed its financial performance aspirations, managers are less
likely to be concerned about the pressure of incremental social disapproval, and will be less motivated to engage in scrutiny bundling. For these
reasons, we hypothesize that high performance relative to aspirations attenuates the relationship between social disapproval and scrutiny-hazarding
action.
Hypothesis 3. The relationship between social disapproval and scrutiny-hazarding action is weaker
(less positive) the stronger the firm’s aspirationrelative performance.

Firm Size as a Buffer
Firm size is a second key factor that both adds to
managers’ feedback about the firm’s performance
and influences the extent to which managers perceive the firm as vulnerable to social disapproval and
the scrutiny that may follow. On the one hand, firm
size can serve as a signal of organizational success
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990) and legitimacy
(Greve, 2008; Stinchcombe, 1965). Thus, not unlike
our prior argument that strong aspiration-relative
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performance muddies the signal of social disapproval, a firm’s large size may similarly make the
firm’s managers less sensitive to the signal of social
disapproval. Managers at large firms may be more
likely to perceive past firm actions as a necessary part
of establishing a noteworthy presence in the industry, and feel that those decisions were justified
due to the organization’s size.
Additionally, large firms face distinct exigencies
and advantages relative to their smaller counterparts. For example, larger firms might attract or acquire resources more easily, due, in part, to their
elevated legitimacy and prestige relative to smaller
firms (Sherer & Lee, 2002). Larger firms may also be
seen as easy targets for social disapproval if they
represent exemplifications of a stigmatized category
(Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009; Vergne,
2012)—there is a larger metaphorical “target on their
back.” Nevertheless, there are two key reasons why
managers of large firms are less likely to scrutiny
bundle.
First, large firms may be less vulnerable or sensitive to unfavorable judgment (i.e., social disapproval) (Chen & Hambrick, 1995). In particular, any
single given pressure is less likely to threaten a large
firm’s short-term survival relative to a smaller firm
(Audia & Greve, 2006; Levinthal, 1991). While large
firms may represent easy targets of social disapproval, any given attack is perceived by managers as
less threatening to the firm’s survival (Cyert & March,
1963; Hambrick, MacMillan, & Day, 1982). As such,
managers of larger firms may be less influenced by
social disapproval compared to managers of smaller
firms. Second, and similarly, larger firms with
greater legitimacy (Sherer & Lee, 2002) may be able to
take the social disapproval “in stride,” as outside
stakeholders’ affinity toward the firm—whether
positive or negative—will not be the sole determinant of the firm’s success or failure (Meyer &
Zucker, 1989). As such, social disapproval is less
likely to prompt a scrutiny-bundling response via
engagement in scrutiny-hazarding action.
Indeed, small firms are more objectively vulnerable to external pressures such as social disapproval,
in that they are relatively less likely to weather
a storm of negative affinity compared to their larger
counterparts (MacMillan, 1980; Singh, 1990).
Moreover, the fact that managers of small firms are
likely to be sensitive to this reality points to both the
critical levers of perceived vulnerability and consistent negative feedback that we hypothesized will
prompt scrutiny bundling. Small firms are more
predisposed to react to perceived threats because of
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their increased vulnerability in the face of such
threats (Cooper, Willard, & Woo, 1986).
As such, we expect that managers of small firms
facing social disapproval are particularly motivated
to engage in scrutiny-hazarding action, whereas
managers of large firms are less motivated by social
disapproval, and are therefore less likely to take such
action. For these reasons, we contend that a firm’s
size attenuates the relationship between social disapproval and scrutiny-hazarding action.
Hypothesis 4. The relationship between social disapproval and scrutiny-hazarding action is weaker
(less positive) the larger the firm’s size.

METHODS
Sample Context: The Upstream Sector of the
Petroleum Industry
We test our conceptual framework in the context of
the upstream petroleum industry. This sector entails
accessing and developing hydrocarbons, and includes activities for “exploration for crude petroleum and natural gas” as well as “the production of
oil through the mining and extraction of oil” (OSHA,
2013). This industry is an appropriate context for
several reasons. First, demand for petroleum resources is increasing in developed, and especially
developing, economies, and petroleum resources are
also vital to other, nonenergy industries, such as
agriculture, clothing and textiles, sports footwear
and apparel, and cosmetics manufacturing (U.S.
Energy Information Administration, 2015). Further,
the petroleum industry is an established one in
which the utility of the key resource is persistent
over time, implying that incumbents in this industry
know what key resource is valuable (petroleum) and
what capabilities are needed to extract value from
that resource (resource access and development),
which has important implications for scrutinyhazarding action.
Second, this industry receives varying amounts
of positive and negative media coverage, providing
the variance necessary to examine the differential
influences of social disapproval. In particular, the
resource development activity (i.e., oil drilling and
production) is an increasingly contentious activity in
the modern sociopolitical landscape, providing an
appropriate setting to test the “scrutiny-hazarding”
feature of our framework.
Third, as noted in the industry description above,
the upstream petroleum industry relies on two
dominant activities—gaining access to petroleum
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resources (i.e., exploration of potential fields that
may or may not contain sufficient petroleum to extract at a later date), or development of petroleum
resources (i.e., extraction and production of petroleum from fields with known petroleum reserves).
These two activities, referred to in this research as
resource access and resource development, are stagelinked as part of the resource cultivation process
(Stadler, Helfat, & Verona, 2013). Both activities carry
economic risk, but resource development activities are
more visible and have greater potential to generate
controversy because resource development represents
the extractive activities (drilling) required to produce
a barrel of oil or equivalent (natural gas; production).
Therefore, resource development activities—drilling
and production—carry a greater hazard for scrutiny
than do resource access activities (exploration). We
later discuss this in greater detail as it pertains to our
dependent variable.
Data Collection
Data for this study were collected from Canadian
firms operating in the upstream sector of the petroleum industry. To create the sample, we used Compustat to identify firms operating in the standard
industrial classification 1311 and headquartered in
Canada from 2003–2010, inclusive. We then
accessed Canada’s System for Electronic Document
Analysis and Retrieval database and searched company filings for each firm-year. This represents an
appropriate sample for two key reasons. First, Canadian reporting standards are unique because firms
are required to disclose annual dollar figures allocated for both resource access and development activities. As indicated above, access and development
are the two main strategic activities for firms operating in this industry (Bass & Chakrabarty, 2014), and
represent firm efforts to either access new resources
through largely geologically based efforts (access)
or develop existing resources through largely
engineering-based efforts (development). Second,
Canada is resource-rich in petroleum and has the
third largest oil reserves in the world, behind Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela (WorldAtlas, 2015). Thus,
because the country has a large amount of oil reserves that have not yet been accessed or developed,
firms operating in Canada make decisions regarding
the extent to which they invest in resource development relative to resource access activities that
constitute the firm’s business activities portfolio.
Data for financial allocations toward access and
development were collected from a variety of company
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reports, including the annual report, the annual information form, and disclosure of oil and gas activities. The result of these efforts was a unique database
of 631 firm-year observations from 149 firms, with
Canadian dollar amounts ascribed for access and
development activities for each firm for each year. In
addition to these petroleum data, we collected firm
data from Compustat and various media sources
(described in detail below). After accounting for
missing data on key constructs, our sample was 326
firm-year observations from 102 firms.3
Dependent Variable: Scrutiny-Hazarding Action
In the upstream petroleum industry, a firm’s relative
focus on the two core activities of this industry—
resource development and resource access—provides
an appropriate measure for scrutiny hazarding. Resource development within the upstream sector is
defined as the “activities aimed at developing oil and
gas reserves to the point where they are commercially
usable” (Stadler et al., 2013: 1787). Following industry standards, this activity describes petroleum
development, which refers to “the drilling and
bringing into production of wells” (Langenkamp,
1994: 105), and thus includes both drilling and production. Resource access within the upstream sector
is defined as the “activities directed toward obtaining oil and gas reserves” by seeking “to obtain new
physical resources” (Stadler et al., 2013: 1787). Using
industry nomenclature, this activity describes petroleum exploration, which refers to “studying large regions that do or could contain petroleum, identifying
progressively smaller areas of progressively greater interest in these until a prospect worth drilling has been
identified” (Chapman, 1983: 67).
While both activities involve risk in the form of
uncertain economic investment to some extent, resource development significantly increases the
3

We ran multiple t-test comparisons between the final
achieved sample and those observations that were dropped due to missing data. In all cases, the achieved sample
included all 326 observations from our analyses. We ran
the tests on our dependent variable (ratio of dollars spent
on resource development to resource access activities),
return on assets (ROA), and firm size. The dropped set
included 289 observations and 287 observations, respectively. For the dependent variable and ROA, the test
statistics were nonsignificant, and the test statistic was
significant for firm size. This is not a surprising finding, as
we expect firms that report development and access investments and that receive media coverage will be larger
than those firms for which we lack such data.
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hazard of scrutiny from external stakeholders because of the public-facing nature of development
activities. Resource development involves the
physical act of extracting petroleum resources (i.e.,
drilling) via producing oil wells (production), which
increases the potential for scrutiny because such
activities are readily observable (De Bondt & Thaler,
1990; Waldron, Navis, & Fisher, 2013), and because
oil drilling and production are often associated
with environmental degradation and safety hazards
(Pennington, Pennington, & Bennett, 2009; World
Wildlife Fund, 2016). Resource access activities, by
comparison, largely entail geological surveying, and
collecting and interpreting seismic data. Although
a necessary precursor to resource development
(Stadler et al., 2013), these activities are not as observable nor inherently controversial, and therefore
do not carry the same scrutiny hazard compared to
resource development activities.
Most firms in our sample engage in both resource
development and resource access activities, and
decision-making regarding investment in one influences investment in the other—for example, investment in development comes at the expense of
access, and vice versa. A unique attribute of our Canadian data is that capital budgets for firms in this
industry typically represent a ratio of resource development to resource access activities, and thus we
capture the relative nature of the relationship between these two activities in our dependent variable.
This relative nature was indicated to us by a petroleum engineer with over 35 years of experience in the
industry, who advised, “Typically, oil companies’
budgets are approved annually and there’s a broad
division of the capital between exploration, production, and facilities and infrastructure,” with the
last category representative of the firm’s property,
plant, and equipment, rather than a strategic activity.
Thus, our dependent variable captures strategic
decision-making relating to investing in one activity
in relation to the other.
We therefore adopt a ratio of dollar amount
invested in resource development divided by dollar
amount invested in resource access. We first incremented all development and access investment
values by 1 to eliminate zero values, and then logtransformed each value to normalize the variable’s
distribution, consistent with Stadler et al. (2013).
Due to the presence of zero values after the logtransformation, we incremented all development
and access investment values by 1, and then created
a ratio of investment in development activities to
investment in access activities.
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Independent Variables
Social disapproval. The media plays a particularly important role in disseminating otherwise unobservable information about the firm and its
activities, and is the most frequently studied external
evaluator of organizations (Bitektine, 2011). We
therefore follow precedent in prior work on social
evaluations by using negative media coverage as
a gauge for overall social disapproval (Durand &
Vergne, 2015; Vergne, 2012).
The media’s reach and influence has grown considerably in recent years due to advancements in
mobile device technology and computer use
(Mitchell & Page, 2015). As outlined by Bednar et al.
(2013), the media serve three major functions when
they report on businesses: (1) they publicize the
views of external stakeholders, allowing different
parties to influence others’ perceptions; (2) they report on issues and events within the “corporate
landscape”; and (3) they serve as an “independent
investigator” or “watchdog” for society.
To collect media coverage data, we used the list of
firms created in our description of the petroleum
data above, and, largely following prior precedent
(Bednar et al., 2013), we searched for media coverage
of the sample firms in The Wall Street Journal,
Businessweek, Forbes, The New York Times, and
The Washington Post. Since our sample is Canadian
oil and gas firms, we also included two Canadian
newspapers, The Globe and Mail and National Post,
as well as the industry trade publication The Daily
Oil Bulletin. We extracted the text of these 34,104
articles, and, for each article, measured the content of
“negative emotion” using the Linguistic Inquiry and
Word Count (LIWC) software program. To help ensure that we only included articles for which the
content pertained to the focal firm, we followed
precedent (Bednar et al., 2013) by excluding articles
that mentioned more than four firms or in which the
focal firm was not mentioned in the first 25% of the
article, which resulted in a total of 6,152 articles. To
investigate the relevance of the articles for the firms
of interest, we randomly selected 180 articles (3% of
our final sample of articles) and manually coded
them for whether they dealt primarily with the firm
of interest. A total of 169 out of the 180 (93.88%)
articles primarily reported on the focal firm, suggesting that our media data are relevant to our sample. The
resulting measure was aggregated by firm-year, using
the average of all articles’ negative valence scores in
a given firm-year. We adopted a one-year lag for our
variable, as we are interested in how the prior year’s
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coverage influences the firm’s current activities
(Bednar et al., 2013).
The overall affective tone of any given media report may be positive or negative, though there are
generally observable trends within a given industry
(Deephouse, 2000; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Within
the context of our sample, positive coverage typically relates to the “value-adding” characteristics
of the industry, such as the critical and valuable
nature of petroleum resources to a variety of industries, including energy, agriculture, clothing and
textiles, sports footwear and apparel, and cosmetics manufacturing (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015). An example from the data is as
follows:
The company drilled one successful well that tested
at 230 [barrels] a day and is awaiting tie-in . . . it has
been making progress on the planning and development of a polymer-based flood for the same field . . .
[the company] plans to drill a core well and has continued to make progress on the [steam-assisted gravity
drainage] pilot application . . . The company said all of
these efforts are focused on its goal of converting resources to reserves, which it believes will add considerable dollar value per [barrel] of oil in the ground.

Negative coverage, on the other hand, typically
relates to the controversial “value-depleting” aspects
of the industry, such as issues surrounding environmental practices, from the way resources are
extracted from the earth (e.g., hydraulic fracturing or
“fracking”) to the industry’s responsibility for environmental accidents (e.g., oil spills). As an example
from the data: “Oil spill still poisoning wildlife years
later, native band charges; Doig River hunters say
they’re finding animals with swollen, black intestines and possible tumors.”
Focus of media coverage. To capture the extent to
which the content of the coverage was related to the
scrutiny-hazarding action of resource development,
we measured the focus of media coverage from
which we measured social disapproval. We first
counted the number of times a set of developmentrelated word segments appeared in each news article. These development-related word segments address concepts that capture the major parts of the
petroleum resource development process (drilling
and production), and include “drill,” “exploit,”
“produc*,” “develop,” “gather,” “storage,” “export,”
and “extract.” As an illustrative example from the
data: “The company expects to gain significant
operating synergies within the development, which
will create the potential to drive exploitation
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opportunities similar to those seen at Primrose over
the last decade.” We divided the total count of
development-related word segments by the overall
word count for the article, and then averaged these
article-specific development-focused content scores
within-firm over the calendar year, resulting in
a measure consistent with the other firm-year variables in our models. Consistent with our measure of
social disapproval, we lagged this measure by one
year.
Aspiration-relative performance. The aspirational
performance level was computed based on the assumption that managers attend to both industry performance and their own firm’s performance when
setting organizational aspirations, and that sometimes
one is more influential for aspirations. Specifically,
we used the “switching model” of aspiration level,
employed in numerous prior studies (for a review, see
Bromiley & Harris, 2014), as represented in the following formulae:
Aspirationi,t21 5 IndustryROAt22 if ROAi,t22
, IndustryROAt22
Aspirationi,t21 5 1:05pROAi,t22 if ROAi,t22
. IndustryROAt22
That is, when the firm’s performance—captured as
ROA—in the prior period (t – 2) has fallen short of the
industry average performance in that period, the
firm’s aspirational level in the next period (t – 1) is set
equal to the industry’s average performance in the
prior period (t – 2). However, when the firm’s performance in period “t – 2” has exceeded industry
performance, the aspirational target for period “t – 1”
is set equal to the firm’s prior performance at time “t –
2,” multiplied by 1.05, as firms are expected to adjust
their aspirations upward as their performance improves. Then, aspiration-relative performance is
operationalized as the firm’s actual performance in
“t – 1” minus the aspirational level in period “t – 1.”
Due to the presence of outliers, we winsorized to the
99th or 1st percentile (Wooldridge, 2010).
Firm size. We measured firm size via the natural
log of total assets. Initial models suggested that
firm size may induce the possibility of multicollinearity due to high variance inflation factors
associated with the variable. We addressed this
possibility by orthogonalizing firm size utilizing a
modified Gram–Schmidt procedure, via the “orthog”
command in Stata 14.0, consistent with prior literature (e.g., Greve & Seidel, 2015; Pollock & Rindova,
2003).
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Controls. Due to the fact that slack can influence
investment decisions (Greve, 2003), we controlled
for financial slack by taking the difference between
current assets and current liabilities (Mishina,
Pollock, & Porac, 2004). Similarly, we controlled
for the debt-to-equity ratio (George, 2005). We also
controlled for total inventory, as this could influence
whether a firm emphasizes development or access
investment. Firms that are growing their sales may
invest differently compared to slower-growth firms,
so we controlled for sales growth rate. Due to the
influence of quantity of media coverage on firm
outcomes (e.g., Kulchina, 2014; Pollock & Rindova,
2003), we controlled for the overall word count of all
articles included in our analysis for a particular firm.
To better isolate the influence of social disapproval
rather than social approval, we controlled for positive media coverage by including the “positive
emotion” score from the LIWC analysis. Both the
overall word count and positive media coverage
variables were lagged one year. Finally, we included
year dummies to control the influence of time.
Analysis and Results
We adopted a fixed-effect specification to account
for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity (Wooldridge,
2010), and used robust standard errors. All independent and control variables were standardized
prior to entering into the regression equation, and
prior to calculating interaction terms (Cohen, Cohen,
West, & Aiken, 2003). Due to the presence of multivariate outliers, we excluded observations that were
greater than 63 SD of the standardized residuals (n 5
15, n 5 2). As we will discuss in the robustness
analysis section here following, we employed alternative estimation techniques, which led to largely
similar results.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and
correlation matrix for the variables used in our study.
Note that the values presented in Table 1 are nonstandardized and nontransformed. The values for
resource development and resource access are individually reported in the table to provide greater
clarity of the variables. Table 2 presents the results
from the fixed-effects regression analysis. Model 1
contains the control variables; Model 2 contains the
controls and the independent variables; Model 3
contains controls, independent, and aspirationrelative performance interaction variables; Model 4
contains controls, independent, and firm size interaction variables; Model 5 contains controls, independent, and the development-focused content
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interaction variables; and Model 6 includes the full
model.
Though the b coefficient for negative media coverage in Model 2 is positive and significant (p 5 .000),
the variable is not significant in the full model shown
in Model 6. As such, Hypothesis 1, which posited that
social disapproval is positively related to a firm’s
investment in scrutiny-hazarding action—that is,
resource development relative to resource access—
is not fully supported. We will discuss the implications of this in the Discussion section, below. Based
on Model 6, the positive and statistically nonsignificant b coefficient for the negative media coverage 3 development-focused content interaction
(p 5 .12), though in the hypothesized direction, does
not support Hypothesis 2. However, and as we will
explore further in the Discussion section, the interaction is statistically significant in Model 5 (p ,
.001)—when the “buffer” interactions are omitted.
The negative and significant (p , .01) b coefficient
for the negative media coverage 3 aspirationrelative performance interaction, and the negative
and significant (p , .05) b coefficient for the negative
media coverage 3 firm size interaction, indicate
support for Hypotheses 3 and 4, which predicted that
aspiration-relative performance and firm size, respectively, would exert attenuating influences on the
social disapproval–scrutiny-hazarding action relationship. We plotted the interactions in Figures 1
and 3, and examined where these interactions were
statistically significant (i.e., at which levels of the
moderators), as depicted by the marginal effect plots
in Figures 2 and 4. As such, for the sake of accuracy,
we chose the “high” and “low” levels of the moderators in Figures 1 and 3 according to the high and low
ends of the range where those interactions were in fact
significant. This allowed us to more accurately plot
the interactions by depicting where they are significant, and not where they are nonsignificant (i.e., 13
SD above the mean). We elaborate on this in the
Discussion section.
In Table 2, the coefficient for negative media coverage in Model 2 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the prior year’s negative media
coverage is associated with a 0.52 unit increase (p ,
.001) in the resource development–resource access
ratio. The only other variable that is significant in
Model 2, the positive media coverage control variable, is significant and in the opposite direction, in
that it appears to discourage resource development
spending relative to resource access spending.
However, what we might call negative media coverage’s “development promotion effect” is almost
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4.51
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0.00
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0.07
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0.04
20.01
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0.75
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0.08
0.03
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0.01
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0.00
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0.02
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20.04
20.09

5

0.68

0.01

0.07

0.04

20.02
0.50
20.21

6

20.04

20.05

20.02

20.02

0.01
20.09

7
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0.00

0.11

20.02

20.13
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20.21
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20.03

20.02
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0.07

20.19
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Notes: n 5 311; number of firms 5 100. Non-standardized/transformed measures. Correlations 6 0.12 and greater are significant at a minimum p , .05 level.

Resource access
Resource development
Log development/log
access
Financial slack
Debt-to-equity ratio
Total inventories
Sales growth rate
Word count
Positive media
coverage
Negative media
coverage
Focus of media
coverage
Aspiration-relative
performance
Assets

Mean

TABLE 1
Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix

0.06

20.04

11

0.01
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TABLE 2
Fixed-Effects Regression Results (DV: Resource Development Relative to Resource Access)

Financial slack
Debt-to-equity ratio
Total inventories
Sales growth rate
Word count
Positive media coverage

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

b/SE

b/SE

b/SE

b/SE

b/SE

b/SE

0.05
(0.04)
20.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)
0.16
(0.14)
20.21†
(0.12)
0.42**
(0.15)
20.13
(0.09)
0.04
(0.07)
20.47
(0.72)

0.03
(0.05)
20.02
(0.02)
0.01
(0.04)
20.01
(0.03)
0.18
(0.14)
20.27*
(0.12)
0.08
(0.16)
20.10
(0.08)
20.11
(0.10)
20.75
(0.67)

0.03
(0.05)
20.02
(0.02)
0.01
(0.04)
0.00
(0.03)
0.21
(0.14)
20.24†
(0.12)
0.05
(0.15)
20.11
(0.09)
20.00
(0.05)
20.71
(0.77)
0.16
(0.10)
20.07**
(0.02)
20.18*
(0.07)
1.58*
(0.60)
2474.09

0.06
(0.04)
20.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.03)
20.01
(0.03)
0.13
(0.15)
20.20
(0.15)

Negative media coverage
Focus of media coverage (FMC)
Aspiration-relative performance (ARP)
Assets (logged)

0.05
(0.04)
20.02
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
20.01
(0.04)
0.15
(0.14)
20.27*
(0.12)
0.52***
(0.13)
20.14
(0.09)
20.13
(0.14)
20.71
(0.69)

Negative media coverage 3 FMC

0.04
(0.04)
20.03
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
20.01
(0.04)
0.20
(0.15)
20.28*
(0.12)
0.28**
(0.10)
20.14
(0.09)
20.11
(0.13)
20.94
(0.75)
0.29**
(0.09)

Negative media coverage 3 ARP

20.11***
(0.02)

Negative media coverage 3 assets
Constant
Log likelihood

1.76**
(0.52)
2497.52

1.77**
(0.55)
2482.55

1.63**
(0.59)
2478.35

1.72**
(0.56)
2478.65

20.28***
(0.07)
1.65**
(0.59)
2476.88

Notes: n 5 311; number of firms 5 100. Year dummies omitted for parsimony. Robust standard errors under coefficients in parentheses.
†
p , .10
*p , .05
**p , .010
***p , .001

twice that of positive media coverage’s “development prevention effect.” This is consistent with the
tendency for negative signals to be more salient than
positive signals (e.g., Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Importantly, however, there is emerging consensus
that the main effect’s results should be interpreted
in the full model in the presence of significant interaction effects (e.g., Aguinis, Edwards, & Bradley,
2017).
In the full model, a one standard deviation increase in the aspiration-relative performance variable weakens the effect of negative media coverage
by 0.07 units, whereas a similar increase in “size”
(total assets) weakens negative media coverage’s effect by 0.18 of a standard deviation. Comparatively
speaking, in the full model, these “buffering” interaction effects have a stronger influence on the

criterion variable than all but the effect of positive
media coverage and two-year effects (omitted from
Table 2 for parsimony). Importantly, our main effect is
no longer significant in the full model, and this is potentially due to the strength of these countervailing
interaction effects. As we elaborate further in the
Discussion section, it may be that negative media coverage is most consequential when size and aspirationrelative performance are at low levels, and that, by
explicitly accounting for their effects, this attenuates
the effect of negative media coverage alone.
Robustness and Endogeneity Analyses
Our sample was restricted to firms that received
media coverage, though this restriction may introduce concerns of sample selection bias, as there
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FIGURE 1
Interaction of Negative Media Coverage and
Aspiration-Relative Performance
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Note: ARP 5 aspiration-relative performance.

were a number of firms within the population that
did not receive media coverage. We explored the
possibility that this bias could influence our results
by utilizing a technique developed by Heckman
(1979) and frequently used in the literature to account for selection bias (e.g., Bednar, 2012). The first
step captured whether a firm received media attention via a probit model that included the total investment in both resource development and resource
access activities (i.e., a sum of the amount invested in
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both activities), net income, employees, cash, total
current assets, and total sales. This stage created a
nonselection hazard, referred to as the inverse Mills
ratio. We then retested each regression and included
the inverse Mills ratio as a control variable in each
equation. The results from each regression were
similar to those reported in Table 2, indicating that
sample selection bias, if present, does not impact our
results.
Though the Heckman technique discussed above
addresses endogeneity concerns that arise from
sample selection bias, endogeneity may arise from
other sources. Endogeneity refers to a correlation
between the independent variable and the equation’s
disturbance term, and may arise from a number of
possibilities, including simultaneous causality,
omitted variables, and others (Semadeni, Withers, &
Certo, 2014). To investigate whether endogeneity
was biasing our estimates, we employed a two-stage
least squares (2SLS) procedure discussed by
Semadeni et al. (2014). This procedure involves the
identification of instruments that are individually
and jointly significant predictors of the potentially
endogenous variable (in the current research, social
disapproval). This procedure was followed by a
Sargan–Hansen test to evaluate whether the instruments were properly excluded from hypothesis
testing, and a Davidson–MacKinnon test to evaluate
whether an instrumental variable approach was appropriate for hypothesis testing.

0.2
0.1
0
–0.1

Effects on linear prediction

0.3

FIGURE 2
Average Marginal Effects of Negative Media Coverage on Development versus Access across Level of
Aspiration-Relative Performance (with 95% CI)
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1
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FIGURE 3
Interaction of Negative Media Coverage and Firm Size
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Our instruments for social disapproval—the “cognitive mechanisms” and “human” variables generated by the LIWC 2007 software—were derived from
the content analysis procedure we employed to calculate our social disapproval independent variable,
and from the same time (t – 1). The “cognitive mechanisms” variable indicates the extent to which the
document employs terminology reflecting, for example, causal relationships, insight, tentativeness, etc.
We expect it to positively correlate with social disapproval, because the media, in their role as infomediaries, attempt to “make sense” of firm action. The
“human” variable reflects the extent to which the
document refers to people (words such as “child,”
“adult,” “male,” “female,” etc.). We expect it to positively correlate with social disapproval due to the
people-centric and intuitive nature of the social disapproval formation process (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).
In the first-stage equation in the 2SLS procedure,
where the social disapproval variable is treated as
potentially endogenous, our instruments were individually (b 5 0.11, p , .01; and b 5 1.52, p , .001,
respectively) and jointly significant (F 5 18.96, p ,
.001) predictors of social disapproval. The second
stage yielded a nonsignificant Sargan–Hansen test
statistic, indicating that the instruments were
jointly valid and properly excluded from the
second-stage equation of the 2SLS, providing evidence that we properly specified our 2SLS estimator.
The nonsignificant test statistic for the Davidson–
MacKinnon test indicates that a noninstrumental

High firm size (+0 SD)

variable estimator is preferred, because the focal variable is not likely to be endogenous (Semadeni et al.,
2014). In consideration of this analysis, we found little
evidence that endogeneity meaningfully biases our
estimates.
Finally, because a firm fixed-effects specification
discards between-firm variance that may be of interest
(Certo, Withers, & Semadeni, 2017), we explored the
robustness of our model by utilizing the generalized
estimating equations (GEE) method, and employed
robust standard errors and an exchangeable correlation structure (Krause, Filatotchev, & Bruton, 2015).
Results are supportive of our fixed effects regression,
though it is noteworthy that the interaction with resource development-focused content was statistically
significant in the hypothesized direction (positive b
coefficient, p , .05) in the full model. Similarly, we
estimated our model with an Arellano–Bond generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure, which
allowed us to use a past set of “internal” variables
contained in the panel—that is, a lagged version of our
dependent variable—as instruments for the current
dependent variable (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012).
Results of the GMM are supportive of all hypotheses,
similar to those from the GEE procedure.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this research is to develop the
scrutiny-bundling perspective, which posits that
social disapproval influences scrutiny-hazarding
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action—those actions that are a core component of
a firm’s operations, but hazard the possibility of
burdensome scrutiny. Conventional theoretical
perspectives have not sufficiently addressed this issue. For example, perspectives rooted in problem
resolution in the wake of performance feedback
(Audia & Greve, 2006) or the distraction or placation
of stakeholders (Cyert & March, 1963; Graffin et al.,
2011; Zavyalova et al., 2012) have not directly
addressed the issue of firm activities central to the
firm’s operations but that carry the hazard of inducing scrutiny. These activities all fall under the
status quo, and therefore conventional perspectives
about status quo deviation do not as clearly apply to
this circumstance.
The limited research that has addressed firm responses to social disapproval has suggested that social disapproval prompts risk aversion (Durand &
Vergne, 2015)—but has focused primarily on the
extreme context of stigmatized industries. Despite
the substantial merits of these prior efforts, most
firms do not operate in stigmatized industries, and
many firms engage in activities that, although scrutiny hazarding, are core to the firm’s operations, and
are not necessarily misconduct.
To help address this considerably unexplored
middle ground corresponding to the majority of
firms’ experiences, we created a conceptual framework, based primarily on concepts from the accounting and political science literatures, that we
term “scrutiny bundling.” We found evidence for
efforts aimed at scrutiny bundling, allowing the firm
to metaphorically “rip off the Band-Aid,” exchanging heightened immediate scrutiny for a potential
reduction in scrutiny over the long term. We hypothesized that social disapproval corresponds to
greater scrutiny-hazarding activity (i.e., scrutiny
bundling), and that this relationship is amplified
when the focus of the media coverage is more directly related to the scrutiny-hazarding action. We
then hypothesized that both size and aspirationrelative financial performance reduce the salience of
disapproval for large and high-performing firms,
thereby attenuating the linkage between social disapproval and scrutiny-hazarding action, and thus
lessening the prospect of a scrutiny-bundling response. Our empirical analyses of the resource development and resource access activities of a sample
of Canadian oil and gas firms provided general support for our conceptual framework.
There are two unexpected and noteworthy findings from our analyses. First, the main effect relationship
is only significant in the absence of the interaction
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between social disapproval and firm size. In other
words, the interaction of social disapproval and
firm size “washes out” the variance from the social
disapproval–scrutiny-hazarding action main effect
relationship. This finding should be considered in
conjunction with Figure 4, which illustrates the average marginal effect of social disapproval across
a range of values for firm size. Figure 4 indicates that
the interaction is significant at low values of firm
size, but there is a lack of significance at higher
values of firm size. This suggests that the interaction
of social disapproval and firm size is quite pronounced among small firms, but less salient for larger
firms. We believe this is an interesting finding, and
generally supportive of our theory that managers of
large firms are less sensitive to, or are buffered from,
the pressure of social disapproval.
The second unexpected finding is that the interaction between social disapproval and focus of
media coverage, though not statistically significant
in the full model, is significant (and in the predicted
direction) when modeled without the presence of the
buffering interactions. Further, the relationship is
statistically significant with the GEE and GMM
modeling techniques in the full model (in the presence of all interactions). This suggests that a strong
linkage between the focus of the media coverage
underlying any social disapproval and the scrutinyhazarding action may exacerbate scrutiny-bundling
efforts. However, when considered in the presence
of relevant buffering factors—that is, aspirationrelative performance and firm size—the relationship may be less consequential to our framework. In
other words, buffers seem to “matter more” than if
the focus of the media coverage is more closely tied to
the scrutiny-hazarding action (e.g., in news articles
for which the subject is hydraulic fracturing drilling
practices). This evidence has important implications
for both theory and practice.
Implications for Theory
Despite substantial work examining how social
evaluations can be valuable to firms and influence
firm performance (e.g., Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova,
2010), very little attention has been paid to the influence that these constructs have on strategic decisions that pervade core organizational operations
(e.g., Petkova et al., 2014). This is largely due to the
relatively recent progress in distinguishing between
various adjacent social evaluation constructs, such
as legitimacy, status, reputation, stigma, and social
approval (e.g., Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).
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The work that has examined how social evaluations influence decisions has been largely focused on
the decisions of other firms due to the focal firm’s
status (Stern, Dukerich, & Zajac, 2014), reputation
(Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997), or stigma
(Reuber & Fischer, 2010). Thus, studies of how social
evaluations influence a firm’s own decision-making
are rare (e.g., Petkova et al., 2014). To that end, our
study suggests that managerial decisions regarding
scrutiny-hazarding action may be closely linked
with social disapproval, in a manner different to
what we would expect from threat rigidity (Staw
et al., 1981) or behavioral theory reasoning (Cyert &
March, 1963). First, social disapproval alone does
not appear to motivate threat rigidity, which should
correspond to a reduction in scrutiny-hazarding action. Second, in contrast to problemistic search’s role
in rectifying underperformance, social disapproval
cannot be remedied through scrutiny-hazarding action.
Substantial opportunities remain to examine the linkages between social evaluations and strategic decisionmaking, particularly by applying the scrutiny-bundling
perspective we demonstrate here.
The scrutiny-bundling perspective may offer
scholars another means to interpret phenomena that
are unexpected from a threat-rigidity or behavioral
theory perspective. Moreover, the scrutiny-bundling
perspective may be applicable to more than just social disapproval. It could potentially be applied to
a range of circumstances in which managers are

motivated to reduce aggregate scrutiny at the expense
of greater short-term scrutiny. Perhaps the greatest insight from our study is that firms exhibit a propensity to
scrutiny bundle, or “rip off the Band-Aid,” in the wake
of social disapproval. Our findings are novel in terms of
challenging and extending existing assumptions and
theory, and also resonated with a group of Canadian
executives that work in the upstream petroleum industry, with whom we discussed our research. First,
we found evidence that executives do indeed care
about disapproval. As one executive, who served as
both vice president of engineering and vice president
of operations, mentioned, “Everything always goes
back to—especially in a public company—‘What’s
the press gonna say about us doing this?’” A vice
president of exploration noted:
Any bad press for a public company is immediately
discussed by the board, management, and major
shareholders. Most often, a special, quiet meeting is
convened. Remember, a public entity is all about
image and shareholder perception. Any crack of that
image could multiply and shatter all. This translates
into lower share price: not good.

Others expressed concern about disapproval eventually bogging down the organization: “The fear is, if
bad press continues, then focus is redirected from
corporate goals and readjusted to the press.”
Our results also bolster the logic around the buffering effects of certain firm-level characteristics
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(Audia & Greve, 2006; Desai, 2008), such as size and
performance. Some work has considered the hazardous effects that prominence can have on amplifying stakeholder pressure (De Bondt & Thaler, 1990;
Pollock, Rindova, & Maggitti, 2008; Waldron et al.,
2013), though relatively less attention has been paid
to the benefits that certain organizational factors can
provide. We add nuance to this discussion by demonstrating that, although social disapproval may
create pressure, size and financial performance may
alleviate that pressure. Figure 2 illustrates the average marginal effect of social disapproval across a range
of values for aspiration-relative performance, and indicates that social disapproval is related to scrutinyhazarding action at lower levels of aspiration-relative
performance, though the relationship becomes statistically nonsignificant at high levels of aspirationrelative performance (greater than plus-one standard
deviation).
As previously mentioned, Figure 4 indicates that
the interaction is significant at low values of firm
size, but nonsignificant at higher values of firm size.
This suggests that the interaction of social disapproval and firm size is quite pronounced among
small firms, but less salient for firms that are at least
“average size” or larger (“average” being inferred
from the zero value for the standardized size measure). When we asked our executives why this might
be the case, one suggested that “well-defined checks
and balances for a large company should ensure that
media scrutiny would not uncover any practice that
would need to be revised as a result of media
investigations.”
Implications for Practice
Perhaps the most salient practical implication of
our work is the link between what the media say and
the choices firms make in response. When experiencing social disapproval, firms might engage in
scrutiny-hazarding action in an effort to endure
greater near-term scrutiny in the hope that it will
subside over the long term. Given the evidence of
scrutiny bundling, we also suggest that our research
might provide competitive insights for firms. When
firms face higher levels of social disapproval, they
are more likely to engage in scrutiny-hazarding action. Thus, managers paying close attention to the
extent of social disapproval experienced by their rivals may be able to predict these rivals’ subsequent
activities. Such managers may have greater opportunity to formulate a response to the scrutinyhazarding action of social disapproval-experiencing
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rivals. Since the social disapproval-experiencing rival may engage in more scrutiny-hazarding action,
this could be very useful information for managers of
firms that are looking to sell assets that would require
scrutiny-hazarding action (e.g., selling producing oil
fields) or looking for a partner to take on the activities
that may engender scrutiny (e.g., a joint venture
intended to develop a new oil field into production).
The manager might view the social disapprovalexperiencing rival as a potential buyer or a partner
for scrutiny-hazarding action.
Limitations and Future Research
The present study is subject to certain limitations. We have argued that, when an organization is
more vulnerable to scrutiny—by virtue of its smaller
size or poorer aspiration-relative performance—
managers are more likely to engage in scrutiny bundling by pursuing scrutiny-hazarding action in the
wake of social disapproval. However, it is possible
that this tendency will reverse at extremely high or
low levels of vulnerability that we were unable to
capture in our data. That is, if the firm is very vulnerable to heightened scrutiny, it may elect to draw
out the duration of low-grade scrutiny because it
cannot withstand the hazard of heightened scrutiny
even for a brief period. On the other hand, if the firm
is extremely robust to heightened scrutiny, it may
take steps to invite greater scrutiny in the hope that
its overall duration—and, by extension, its long-term
impact—can be reduced. Subsequent studies may
advance our knowledge of this issue by examining
the extremes of scrutiny vulnerability among firms of
various sizes and performance. Similarly, we framed
our arguments around the pressure of social disapproval, though there are a number of other issues that
affect strategic decision-making. Although we included a number of control variables and tested the
robustness of our results in various ways, we are
unable to account for all of the various issues that are
relevant to the investment decision-making process.
Moreover, as the purpose of this research is descriptive rather than normative, we have offered no
prescriptions about whether scrutiny bundling is an
appropriate or effective means of advantaging the
firm or enabling greater managerial discretion by
reducing stakeholder pressure. However, it may be
that managers can use the media as a strategic tool
based on the activities they know they must perform
in the near future. When facing scrutiny, managers
might be advantaged by saving announcements likely
to be judged more positively by stakeholders—for
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example, charitable donations, joining a task force
designed to lead innovations in environmental stewardship, or an expansion that would increase the
number of local jobs—for a time when the firm is experiencing less social disapproval. Once the firm is
under scrutiny, it might make the most strategic sense
for the firm to embrace that scrutiny and engage in
activities that engender more scrutiny. In that light,
managers can choose to save more positive announcements until the spotlight is off of the firm.
CONCLUSION
In a time in which the media is ubiquitous and
consumers have ready access to a variety of information about firms and their activities, it is important
to consider how managers respond to the reality of
social disapproval in their strategic activities. While
prior research has considered response strategies oriented around avoidance, distraction, or problem resolution, we propose that decision-makers, when faced
with social disapproval, may engage in scrutiny bundling, or temporally increasing scrutiny-hazarding
action. Our study challenges and extends existing understanding of how firms respond to social disapproval, especially as related to core activities that
comprise a firm’s everyday operations. In doing so, we
offer a step toward improving understanding of how
firms respond to social disapproval given the sociopolitical realities of the modern marketplace.
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